this Marxist account barely exists; in the standard genre of the history of international law it is mentioned only to be dismissed. Thus, the USSR gave enormous material and moral support to the National Liberation Movements, and led the successful drive to see the principle and then right to selfdetermination placed at the centre of public international law in the 20 th and 21 st centuries.
'TAKING THE DOGMA FOR A WALK'
Western scholars are familiar with what is generally termed the "Marxist-Leninist theory" in international law, and with its standard characterisation. 7 Ian Scobbie in a international law." 16 Thus, Soviet theory recognised only treaties and customnarrowly defined as above -as sources of international law.
The US scholar Alwyn Freeman 17 , writing much earlier, also noted that Soviet international law embraced:
"…the most extreme form of positivism… The Soviet brand of positivism is much more restricted, much narrower, and is, in sum, a rejection of a great portion of international legal principles… Soviet positivism has been distinguished by the exclusion of customary practice as a source of international obligations. It views international law as embracing only those principles to which states have expressly consented through an international agreement or have otherwise manifested their acquiescence." There is, however, a point at which this conservatism shows another, opposite side.
Freeman did not fail to notice it, in his discussion of sovereignty. He explained that the Soviets "… retain the classical, strict conception of states alone as the subjects of 16 G. international law, with a rigid insistence on sovereignty in its most extreme form, a form which must deny the paramount nature of international law over national law.
They do, however, recognise an exception in favour of peoples fighting for "national liberation."" 21 It is very odd, however, that Freeman did not notice the basis for such a claim: the right of peoples to self-determination. This "principle" had become a "right" as the common first article of the two International Covenants of 1966 -the "International Bill of Rights".
Scobbie quite rightly notes the notorious so-called "Brezhnev doctrine", that relations between socialist states are not based on "peaceful co-existence", but on "proletarian internationalism". This hypocritical policy justified the invasions of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1980. 22 But, curiously, he says nothing about the application of the "right of peoples to self-determination" to Soviet support for the national liberation struggles of three decades from WWII.
In the next section of this chapter, therefore, I analyse the origins of the Soviet doctrine of the right of nations to self-determination. It should be noted that in
Russian as in many other languages, "nation" and "people" are practically synonymous.
THE BOLSHEVIKS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Bolshevism versus Austro-Marxism
The Bolshevik and then Soviet doctrine of the right of nations to self-determination had its origin in the uncompromising pre-WW I struggle between Lenin, Stalin and Congress of the Social Democrats of the Latvian Area", he denounced the "bourgeois falsity of the slogan of "cultural national autonomy". He asserted that in Russia only the Jewish Bund members -"together with all the Jewish bourgeois parties" -had so far defended this concept. 31 Later that year he devoted an article to "Cultural-National
Autonomy" 32 . He once more denounced this plan, as "an impossibility":
"A clear grasp of the essence of the "cultural-national autonomy" programme is sufficient to enable one to reply without hesitation -it is absolutely impermissible. As long as different nations live in a single state they are bound to one another by millions and thousands of millions of economic, legal and social bonds. How can education be extricated from these bonds? Can it be 'taken out of the jurisdiction of the state', to quote the Bund formula?"
Lenin particularly mocked the references to Austria:
"… why should the most backward of the multinational countries be taken as the model? Why not take the most advanced? This is very much in the style of the bad Russian liberals, the Cadets, who for models of a constitution turn mainly to the backward countries such as Prussia and Austria, and not to advanced countries such like France, Switzerland and America!" "… a named unit of population with common ancestry myths and shared historical memories, elements of shared culture, a link with a historic territory, and some measure of solidarity, at least among the elites." 34 Note the importance of the link to territory. Again, he defines the modern nation, in ideal-typical terms, as "… a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common rights and duties for all members." John Hutchinson, too, contends that "… Nations are distinguished in addition by a commitment to citizenship rights, and the possession of a high literate culture, a consolidated territory and a unified economy."
Stalin's "scientific" contribution
They are all agreed on the importance of territory.
Stalin's next move was a critique of Renner and Bauer, insisting on the importance of territory: "Bauer's point of view, which identifies a nation with its national character, divorces the nation from its soil, and converts it into an invisible, self-contained force." Stalin answer was as follows: "… there is no doubt a) that cultural-national autonomy presupposes the integrity of the multi-national state, whereas selfdetermination goes outside the framework of this integrity, and b) that selfdetermination endows a nation with complete rights, whereas national autonomy endows it only with cultural rights."… and he further warned that "Springer's and Bauer's cultural-national autonomy is a subtle form of nationalism." In April-June 1914 Lenin published his own substantial work on the question, a polemic against Rosa Luxemburg, who opposed the break-up of the Tsarist Empire, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination". 37 In the first chapter, he insisted that "… it would be wrong to interpret the right to self-determination as meaning anything "We demand freedom of self-determination, i.e., independence, i.e., freedom of secession for the oppressed nations, not because we have dreamt of splitting up the country economically, or of the ideal of small states, but, on the contrary, because we want large states and the closer unity and even fusion of nations, only on a truly democratic, truly internationalist basis, which is inconceivable without the freedom to secede. Just as Marx, in 1869, demanded the separation of Ireland, not for a split between Ireland and Britain, but for a subsequent free union between them, not so as to secure "justice for Ireland", but in the interests of the revolutionary struggle of the British proletariat, we in the same way consider the refusal of Russian socialists to demand freedom of self-determination for nations, in the sense we have indicated above, to be a direct betrayal of democracy, internationalism and socialism." 41 Finally, in 1916, in a long article entitled 'The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up" 42 , Lenin wrote, with regard to the colonies:
"Our theses say that the demand for the immediate liberation of the colonies is as "impracticable" (that is, it cannot be effected without a number of revolutions and is not stable without socialism) under capitalism as the selfdetermination of nations, the election of civil servants by the people, the democratic republic, and so on-and, furthermore, that the demand for the liberation of the colonies is nothing more than "the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination"" of the right to self-determination to all peoples, thereby discarding the imperialist distinction between "civilised" and "uncivilised" nations.
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In fact, the Decree declared that:
"By annexation or seizure of foreign territory the government, in accordance with the legal concepts of democracy in general and of the working class in particular, understands any incorporation of a small and weak nationality by a large and powerful state without a clear, definite and voluntary expression of agreement and desire by the weak nationality, regardless of the time when such forcible incorporation took place, regardless also of how developed or how backward is the nation forcibly attached or forcibly detained within the frontiers of the [larger] state, and, finally, regardless of whether or not this large nation is located in Europe or in distant lands beyond the seas.
If any nation whatsoever is detained by force within the boundaries of a certain state, and if [that nation], contrary to its expressed desire whether such desire is made manifest in the press, national assemblies, party relations, or in protests and uprisings against national oppression, is not given the right to determine the form of its state life by free voting and completely free from the presence of the troops of the annexing or stronger state and without the least desire, then the dominance of that nation by the stronger state is annexation, i.e., seizure by force and violence." And second:
"The dying out of the categories… of bourgeois law by no means signifies that they are replaced by new categories of proletarian law -precisely as the dying out of the category of value, capital, gain and so forth will not (with the transition to expanded socialism) mean that new proletarian categories of worth, capital rent and so forth appear. The dying out of the categories of bourgeois law will in these conditions signify the dying out of law in general: that is to say, the gradual disappearance of the juridic element in human relations."
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As Garlan notes, it follows from these propositions that the transition period of the dictatorship of the proletariat had to take the form of bourgeois law. Thus, the task of transition law was to eliminate itself, by way of a rapid movement to policytechnical -administration as opposed to civil and criminal law. Miéville traces and explains his arguments in Chapter Three, and seeks, through "immanent reformulation", to answer some criticisms of Pashukanis. Miéville, law is called forth as a "specific form of social regulation… That form is law, which is characterised by its abstract quality, its being based on the equality of its subjects and its pervasive character in capitalism." 66 Miéville refers with approval to
Pashukanis' "… assertion that private law, rather than public law, is the 'fundamental, primary level of law'. The rest of the legal superstructure can be seen as essentially derived from this." 67 In fact, Pashukanis' assertion goes rather further, and is as follows:
"Yet while civil law, which is concerned with the fundamental, primary level of law, makes use of the concept of subjective rights with complete assurance, application of this concept in public-law theory creates misunderstandings and contradictions at every step. For this reason, the system of civil law is distinguished by its simplicity, clarity and perfection, while theories of constitutional law teem with far-fetched constructs which are so one-sided as to become grotesque. The form of law with its aspect of subjective right is born in a society of isolated bearers of private egotistic interests…" "A difficulty that arises from a Marxist point of view is that the bourgeois regime is one of generalised commodity production; that is, it treats labourpower as a commodity and pumps out surplus labour from the wage-workers. Yet Pashukanis makes reference to commodity exchange without taking account of the various forms of production that might involve production for a market…" 73 In other words, Pashukanis has failed to take into account the whole of human precapitalist history.
Second, Mieville, it seems to me, takes insufficient notice of Bob Fine's critical remarks, which go to the heart of this particular re-appropriation of Pashukanis. First, as Fine points out, "Whereas Marx derived law from relations of commodity production, Pashukanis derived it from commodity exchange." 74 This, according to Fine, leads Pashukanis to a conclusion that was plainly wrong:
"Instead of seeing both the content and the forms of law as determined by and changing with the development of productive relations, Pashukanis isolated law from its content and reduced quite different forms of law, expressing qualitatively different social relations, to a single, static and illusory 'legal form'." for the remainder of the Stalin period was based on the assertion that he failed to point out that "international law must be defined as class law in terms so simple and expressive that no one could possibly be deceived." 87 According to the US scholar Hazard, the Soviet reader was supposed by Soviet orthodoxy to be able to find "simple proof of the theoretician's argument that foreign policy is shaped to fit the demands of the struggle between the classes, and that international law as the tool of that policy is no more than a reflection of class conflicts calling for some attempts at solution." 88 As against Korovin, for whom a change of form must follow a change of substance, so that the Soviet Union had brought with it a new form of international law, the "international law of the transition period", Pashukanis had argued for a continuation of old forms, including diplomatic immunity, the exchange of representatives, and the customary law of treaties, not least since these gave the Soviet Union considerable protection.
Pashukanis roundly condemned Korovin's doctrine:
"… scholars such as Korovin who argued that the Soviet Government should recognise only treaties [as a source of] international law and should reject custom are absolutely wrong. An attempt to impose upon the Soviet Government a doctrine it has nowhere expressed is dictated by the patent desire to deprive the Soviet Government of those rights which require no treaty formulation and derive from the fact that normal diplomatic relations exist." 89 Pashukanis also came in for particular criticism because he called the principle rebus sic stantibus "healthy". 90 Most copies of the Essays were destroyed after he was denounced in 1937, but in this culminating work he declared that any attempt to define the "nature of international law" was scholastic. 91 In his view, such attempts were the result of the continuing influence of bourgeois legal methodology, which, he said, rested on the association of law with substance developing in accordance with its own internal principles. For him, in 1935, international law was a means of formulating and strengthening in custom and treaties various political and economic relationships between states, and that the USSR could use international law to further Soviet interests in the struggle with capitalist states. He saw no reason to believe that in using these principles of international law for its own purposes the USSR was compromising its principles, in a world in which most states were capitalist. For Pashukanis there was no point in seeking to determine whether international law was "bourgeois" or "socialist"; such a discussion would be "scholastic". 92 This approach to international law is as far as it could be from a "commodity-form" theory. It is utterly positivist in its approach, in precisely the manner described by the "standard genre" to which I referred above. For Pashukanis, international law is composed simply of the treaties concluded by states, and such customary law as every state could agree on. 94 He also declared that the earliest international law appeared with the earliest class society, that is, with the development of the slave holding state which grew out of the tribal civilisation of primitive man as division of labour and acceptance of the concept of private property stratified society into classes. 95 Vyshinsky, Pashukanis' nemesis -and Stuchka's theoretical successor -was diametrically opposed to this:
"Only one who is consciously falsifying history and reality can perceive in capitalist society the supreme and culminating point of legal development… Only in socialist society does law acquire a firm ground for its development…. As regards the scientific working out of any specific problems, the basic and decisive thought must be the aspiration to guarantee the development and strengthening of Soviet law to the highest degree." Pashukanis' 1925-27 conception that "The real historical content of international law, therefore, is the struggle between capitalist states" 98 rapidly gave way to "socialism in one country" and "peaceful co-existence". As Hazard pointed out in 1938, "throughout the whole of any future discussion, the (Soviet) writer must re-emphasise the struggle for peace which is being waged by the USSR, and show how this struggle rests upon the sanctity of treaties and the observance of international obligations." In the circumstances, Pashukanis could not possibly have predicted the thoroughly contradictory developments which followed WWII, in particular the creation and transformation of the United Nations, the development of the great multilateral, in some cases universal, international treaties, and the consolidation of political principles such as self-determination into fundamental principles -legal rights -of international law. Indeed, it was his own theoretical position which prevented him from doing so. His great protagonist E A Korovin, writing as early as 1923, placed particular emphasis on "Sovereignty as national self-determination", "The legal form of self-determination", "Bourgeois self-determination and the method of 'Balkanisation'". 101 Korovin was much more a Bolshevik -a Leninist -than Pashukanis ever was. Through this practice, it gave the bourgeois norms a new Socialist content. 133 Dealing with the Czechoslovak events, Tunkin argued that these were a logical extension of the concept already well developed and applied in Hungary in 1956. This was the legal prevention of inroads by capitalist influences into a socialist state. 134 The international law framework is provided through an analysis of the concept of sovereignty. Tunkin noted that both general and socialist international law respected the concept of "sovereignty", but concluded that respect is not the same thing in the two systems. 135 Socialist states would continue to insist on respect for the principle as "Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev delivered a speech behind closed doors in which he asserted that "a mighty upsurge of anti-imperialist, nationalliberation revolutions" was sweeping through the "third world." He went on to say that "Communists fully and unreservedly support such just wars . . . of national liberation."
WHY DID PASHUKANIS MISS SELF-DETERMINATION
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The impact of Khrushchev's words was felt in the US itself and in its subsequent policy:
"The speech, published in the Soviet press just two days before the newly elected President John F. Kennedy took his oath of office, had a profound effect on the new administration which regarded it as a portent of wars to come. Kennedy and his advisers concluded that the Cold War was entering a new phase which would take place in the "third world," and would be characterized by guerrilla wars. Accordingly, they sought to improve the nation's ability to conduct counter insurgency warfare by dramatically expanding the Army's Special Forces or, "green berets." Before Kennedy's assassination in Dallas in 1963, he had dispatched over 16,000 of them to South Viet Nam in order to engage in just such a conflict. The war for the "third world," and a new phase of the Cold War had gotten under way in earnest."
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This address may well be apocryphal; it has proved impossible for me to track down a definite reference. But there is every reason to believe that its effect was as described. The leading Soviet scholars were, in the end, obliged to abandon both positivism and the revolutionary content of self-determination. Writing in 1991, just before the dissolution of the USSR, and using the new language of "perestroika", "common human values" and "common European home", Blishchenko also argued for "re- For me, it is vitally important to note that the demand for self-determination became a vitally important part of the external legitimation and ideological self-empowerment of these movements. In a paradoxical -and dialectical -fashion, the USSR, despite the profound deracination of its approach to international law, as exemplified by Vyshinsky 144 and Tunkin 145 , found itself obliged to give very considerable material support to self-determination struggles, despite the fact that this was not only materially costly but often contrary to its own geo-political self-interest. I mean dialectical in the following way: the content of the proposed norm often came into sharp conflict with its juridical form, and in the process the content was imbued with a new significance, in due course transforming the form as well. 
